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Abstract 
Thematically related concepts like coffee & milk are judged to be more similar than 
thematically unrelated concepts like coffee & lemonade. We investigated whether thematic 
relations exert a small effect that occurs consistently across participants (i.e., a generalized 
model), or a large effect that occurs inconsistently across participants (i.e., an individualized 
model). We also examined whether difference judgments mirrored similarity or whether these 
judgments were, in fact, non-inverse. Five studies demonstrated the necessity of an 
individualized model for both perceived similarity and difference, and additionally provided 
evidence that thematic relations affect similarity more than difference. Results suggest that 
models of similarity and difference must be attuned to large and consistent individual 
variability in the weighting of thematic relations.  
 
KEYWORDS: dual process model; individual differences; non-inversion; perceived 
difference; perceived similarity; thematic relations.  
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 Similarity and difference are fundamental to cognition. They determine, in large part, 
the recognition of familiar objects and the categorization of novel objects, and they drive 
inferences about an object’s features and its predicted behavior in a novel context. Essentially, 
similarity and difference have been implicated in nearly every cognitive process from 
perceptual classification to economic decision-making. Given that similarity and difference 
influence so many other cognitive processes, then, it is crucial to determine what factors 
influence the perceptions of similarity and difference themselves.  
Some potentially important factors remain underspecified in contemporary models of 
similarity and difference. For example, perceived similarity and difference may exhibit large 
individual differences (Simmons & Estes, 2008), but current models fail to account for this 
presumed variability. Moreover, the relationship between similarity and difference appears to 
be surprisingly complex (Medin, Goldstone, and Gentner, 1990), and current models do not 
adequately explain this relationship. Below we report five studies that investigate directly 
these currently unresolved issues. We first review the major models of semantic similarity, 
with particular emphasis on the dual process model (Bassok & Medin, 1997; Estes, 2003; 
Simmons & Estes, 2008; Wisniewski & Bassok, 1999), and then we summarize the literature 
on the relationship between similarity and difference.  
Models of Similarity 
In general, similarity can be described in terms of three types of information: features, 
structural relations, and thematic relations. Of these, features make the most intuitive 
contribution - the more features that two things have in common, the more similar they are. 
This intuition is formalized in the contrast model (Tversky, 1977), which construes the 
similarity of two concepts as a function of their common features weighed against their 
distinctive features. Similarity increases as the number of commonalities increases or the 
number of differences decreases. For example, a bluebird and a crow are perceived to be 
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similar because their many common features (beaks, wings, etc) outweigh their few 
distinctive features (size, color). And if the bluebird were to grow black feathers, then its 
similarity to a crow would increase still further (Gati & Tversky, 1984). 
However, features alone are not sufficient for determining similarity. To understand 
why, consider the following example from Medin, Goldstone, and Gentner (1993): “Person 1 
has on a black and white striped shirt and red and green checkered pants, and Person 2 has on 
a black and white checkered shirt and red and green striped pants” (p. 260). How similar are 
Person 1 and Person 2? Both wear one striped item and one checkered item, and each wears 
one black and white item and one red and green item. So by a simple feature matching model 
such as the contrast model, these two people are wearing maximally similar costumes. Such a 
model fails to capture the relationship between the pattern and the coloring of each garment.   
The structural alignment model (Gentner & A. B. Markman, 1994, 1997; A. B. 
Markman, 1996; A. B. Markman & Gentner, 1993a, 1993b) provides a solution to this 
problem. According to this model, one’s concepts are structured representations that encode 
features as well as the relationships among features (i.e., structural relations). Judging 
similarity involves bringing two representations into alignment, so as to maximize conceptual 
overlap. Returning to the above example, the representations must be aligned so that one shirt 
is compared directly to the other shirt, and likewise for the pants. This process highlights the 
similarity between their conceptual structure (i.e., both are wearing shirts and pants), and it 
draws attention to differences related to this structure (i.e., the two shirts have different 
patterns, as do the pants). Thus, structural relations are a necessary and important component 
of any model of similarity. 
Thematic relations also have a significant, albeit smaller, influence on perceived 
similarity (see Simmons & Estes, 2008). The critical contrast between structural relations and 
thematic relations is that whereas structural relations occur within a single stimulus, thematic 
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relations occur between stimuli. To illustrate, a flower is connected to its stem in the same 
way that an eraser is attached to a pencil, thereby constituting a similarity of structural 
relations. But flowers and pencils are not thematically related. In contrast, flowers and bees 
are thematically related, but share few if any structural relations. An extensive body of 
research indicates that structural relations guide the comparison process, which in turn largely 
determines the perception of similarity and difference (for review see Gentner & A. B. 
Markman, 1997). Of greater interest for the present purposes, however, is a growing body of 
evidence suggesting that thematic relations also influence perceived similarity and difference. 
Indeed, the importance of thematic relations to similarity judgments has been 
demonstrated across a variety of stimuli and tasks. Bassok and Medin (1997) found that when 
judging the similarity of two sentences containing the same nouns (e.g., The carpenter fixed 
the chair & The carpenter sat on the chair), participants justified their ratings by integrating 
the sentences into a common scenario (e.g., “[T]he carpenter sat on the chair to see whether 
he fixed it well”). Thus, participants justified similarity not by comparing structural relations 
(e.g., both sentences are about carpenters), but by inventing a novel thematic relation to link 
the actions in each sentence. The most direct evidence for a thematic influence on similarity is 
the finding that thematically related concepts are judged to be more similar than thematically 
unrelated concepts. For example, Wisniewski and Bassok (1999) demonstrated that 
participants rated apple pie & ice cream as more similar than apple pie & jello, presumably 
because of the thematic link between apple pie and ice cream (i.e., the two often are eaten 
together). Estes (2003) had one group of participants simply rate the similarity of concept 
pairs such as pancake & spatula, whereas another group of participants thematically 
integrated the concepts prior to rating their similarity. The same two concepts were judged 
more similar by participants who had integrated them than by participants who had not. More 
recently, Jones and Love (2007) explicitly stated a relation between two concepts (e.g., The 
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collie herds the sheep) before soliciting ratings of their similarity. Their results corroborated 
the observation that a thematic relation between two concepts increases the perceived 
similarity of those concepts.  
The structural alignment model fails to explain this influence of thematic relations on 
perceived similarity and difference. For example, from the perspective of alignment theory, 
assessing the similarity of apple pie and ice cream requires aligning the two representations to 
apprehend commonalties (both are desserts, both are sweet) and differences related to 
conceptual overlap (ice cream is colder than apple pie). Structural alignment accounts for the 
relations between the features of a single stimulus, but it often underestimates perceived 
similarity because it fails to account for the relation between two stimuli. In fact, Gentner and 
Brem (1999; see also Gentner & Gunn, 2001) reject thematic relations as a legitimate source 
of similarity. In their view, similarity is synonymous with comparison (i.e., structural 
alignment); therefore, any other process that influences a similarity task (e.g., thematic 
integration) is considered illegitimate.  
Importantly, thematic relations cannot be represented as commonalities of the form 
“Both X and Y participate in scenario Z.” Gentner and Gunn (2001) presented pairs of 
concepts and instructed participants to list either thematic relations between the items or 
commonalities. They found that the two tasks had different effects on the subsequent 
processing of those stimuli: Whereas listing thematic relations inhibited the detection of 
differences between concepts, listing commonalities facilitated the detection of differences. 
Critically, if a thematic relation between two concepts was merely a commonality between 
them, then listing thematic relations and listing commonalities should have elicited similar 
effects. Thus, thematic relations are not represented as common features and cannot be 
accounted for by a single process model (see also Simmons & Estes, 2008). 
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 The dual process model (Bassok & Medin, 1997; Estes, 2003; Wisniewski & Bassok, 
1999) accommodates the influence of thematic relations simply by allowing both comparison 
(i.e., structural alignment) and integration to affect similarity. According to the model, the 
relative influences of the comparison and integration processes will depend on the 
relationship between the items: Comparison is more heavily weighted for structurally 
alignable items (i.e., those with similar conceptual structure), whereas integration is more 
heavily weighted for thematically related items. Furthermore, the relative dominance of a 
given process can also be mediated by the task itself: Structural alignment should dominate 
similarity judgments, and thematic integration should dominate relational judgments. Thus, 
the dual process model predicts that stimulus and task factors interact to determine which 
processing mechanism (i.e., alignment or integration) will dominate judgment. A further 
question of interest—which will serve as the focus of the present investigation—is whether 
the relative dominance of these distinct processing mechanisms also varies systematically 
across participants.  
Individual Differences in Similarity 
The dual process model tacitly assumes a generalized effect of thematic relations on 
judgments of similarity. That is, most or all participants are predicted to rate items like milk & 
coffee to be slightly more similar than pairs like milk & lemonade, because the former pair is 
thematically related but the latter pair is not. By this standard version of the dual process 
model, which we will refer to as a generalized model, each participant exhibits a thematic 
effect. As an alternative, we note that the small thematic effect observed in prior tasks might 
instead be attributable to substantial individual differences in the perception of similarity. By 
an individualized model, some participants assign milk & coffee a much higher similarity 
rating than milk & lemonade, while other participants assign the two pairs roughly equal 
ratings. Put differently, there may be a large thematic effect for a subset of participants only, 
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with little or no thematic effect for other participants. The relatively small thematic effect 
observed in prior studies may result from averaging across these two groups of participants.  
If the generalized model is correct, then certainly much remains to be specified in the 
dual process model (e.g., how thematic integration occurs), but the basic model delineated by 
Wisniewski and Bassok (1999) would provide a sound framework for further development. In 
contrast, if the individualized model were correct, then models of similarity would require 
more substantial revision. In particular, models of similarity may require the addition of an 
individual parameter, and in fact, this parameter may ultimately prove more important than 
either the stimulus parameter or the task parameter. The purpose of the present investigation, 
therefore, was to discriminate between the generalized and individualized versions of the dual 
process model.  
Preliminary evidence from research on categorization supports the individualized 
model. A traditional assumption about category learning is that adults form taxonomic 
(comparison-based) rather than thematic (integration-based) categories. Lin and Murphy 
(2001; see also Murphy, 2001) found across several studies that many participants 
consistently categorized a base concept (camel) with a taxonomically related alternative 
(antelope) rather than with a thematically related alternative (desert). But a substantial 
number of other participants consistently categorized the base concepts with the thematically 
related alternative instead. To the extent that categorization is based on similarity, it is likely 
that comparable individual differences will be observed in similarity judgments as well. 
Indeed, we have found elsewhere that some participants exhibit a systematic dissociation of 
similarity and categorization judgments, while other participants exhibit no such dissociation 
(Hampton, Estes, & Simmons, 2007). Thus, research on categorization suggests that different 
individuals may perceive similarity in very different ways.  
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Some prior research on similarity indicates that individual differences in similarity are 
associated with thematic integration. Gentner and Brem (1999) describe a screening task in 
which 702 participants were presented triads consisting of a base, a taxonomic alternative, 
and a thematic alternative (cf. Lin & Murphy, 2001). Participants were instructed to choose 
the alternative that was most similar to the base. Of Gentner and Brem’s sample, 41% of 
participants exhibited no systematic preference for either alternative (i.e., taxonomic or 
thematic). However, 48% consistently chose the taxonomic alternative, while 11% 
consistently chose the thematic alternative (see also Simmons & Estes, 2008, described 
below). This study indicates systematic individual differences in the perception of similarity. 
Non-Inversion of Similarity and Difference 
The simplest model of similarity and difference would hold that these factors are 
complementary, or inverse. That is, as similarity increases, difference decreases to the same 
extent. For instance, if cats and dogs have a similarity rating of 6 on a 1-to-7 scale, then they 
ought to have a difference rating of 2. However, in certain cases perceived similarity is not 
inversely related to perceived difference. Medin et al. (1990) demonstrated a non-inversion 
between similarity and difference using configurations of geometric shapes in a triad task. For 
a given target item (e.g., a black square above a white circle) one response option matched in 
relation information but mismatched in attribute information (e.g., a white square above a 
white circle), whereas the other matched in attribute information but mismatched in relation 
information (e.g., a black square next to a white circle). When asked to pick the alternative 
that was more similar to the target, participants usually chose the relation match. However, 
participants also usually chose the relation match when the task was to pick the alternative 
that was more different from the target. That is, participants chose the same items as both 
more similar and more different. Estes and Hasson (2004) found a similar pattern of results. 
In their experiment, participants preferred the relation match in the similarity condition, but 
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showed no preference in difference. Bassok and Medin (1997) demonstrated non-inversion in 
a sentence comparison task. Participants judged a base sentence (The carpenter fixed the 
chair) as more similar to a relational match (The electrician fixed the radio) than to an 
attribute match (The carpenter sat in the chair). But once again, participants demonstrated no 
preference in difference judgments. In each of these studies, the non-inversion was 
attributable to a greater relative weighting of structural relations in similarity than in 
difference.  
Simmons and Estes (2008) tested whether thematic relations might also induce a non-
inversion of similarity and difference. We solicited from participants both similarity ratings 
and difference ratings (between-participants) for the same pairs of thematically related and 
unrelated concepts. Results corroborated the influence of thematic relations on perceived 
similarity (Wisniewski & Bassok, 1999). But more importantly, this thematic effect was 
significantly attenuated in difference ratings, thereby producing a non-inversion. In 
Experiment 1, for instance, thematic relatedness accounted for 54% of the variance in 
similarity ratings, but only 34% of the variance in difference ratings. In another experiment 
we explicitly instructed participants to base their ratings on features alone, and participants 
generally were able to discount thematic relations from their ratings. This exclusion of 
thematic relations substantially reduced the non-inversion. In a final experiment we 
administered a similarity triad task (cf. Gentner & Brem, 1999; Lin & Murphy, 2001) prior to 
the similarity or difference rating task. Consistent with previous studies, the triad task 
revealed substantial individual variability in perceived similarity. More interesting, though, 
was the finding that participants’ preference for thematic alternatives in the triad task better 
predicted their subsequent similarity ratings than their difference ratings. So, again thematic 
relations were more closely associated with perceived similarity than with perceived 
difference. Even more strikingly, participants who preferred thematic choices exhibited a non-
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inversion of similarity and difference, whereas participants who preferred taxonomic choices 
did not exhibit the non-inversion. These experiments provide initial evidence that thematic 
relations are more heavily weighted in similarity judgments than in difference judgments, and 
that this effect is observed only in a subset of participants.  
In summary, although the generalized dual process model (e.g., Wisniewski & Bassok, 
1999) currently offers the only account of thematic relations, more recent evidence appears to 
support an individualized model instead. Below we report a series of studies that examine in 
greater detail the presumed individual variability of perceived similarity and difference.  
Experiment 1a 
The purpose of Experiment 1a was to provide an initial test of the generalized and 
individualized models. The experiment also tested whether a preference for thematic choices 
is related to the non-inversion of similarity and difference, as suggested by Simmons and 
Estes (2008). Using the triad choice task (Gentner & Brem, 1999; E. M. Markman & 
Hutchinson, 1984; see also Lin & Murphy, 2001), participants chose whether a taxonomic 
alternative or a thematic alternative was more similar to (or more different from) a base 
stimulus. For instance, the base stimulus bee was presented with alternative choices fly and 
honey, and participants chose the alternative that was either more similar to or more different 
from the base (between-participants). The generalized model (Bassok & Medin, 1997; Estes, 
2003; Wisniewski & Bassok, 1999) assumes between-participant agreement. That is, the 
proportion of thematic choices should be relatively constant across participants. Alternatively, 
the individualized model assumes that the dominance of comparison or integration is largely 
determined by the individual. Thus, the individualized model predicts between-participant 
disagreement; many thematic respondents and many taxonomic respondents should be 
observed. Finally, if thematic relations are more relevant to similarity than to difference, as 
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suggested by the results of Simmons and Estes (2008), then thematic choices should be more 
common in similarity than in difference judgments.  
Method 
Participants. Participants in all experiments were undergraduates at the University of 
Georgia, all were native English speakers, and all received course credit for participation. In 
Experiment 1a, 68 participants were randomly assigned to a Similarity condition (n = 35) or a 
Difference condition (n = 33). 
Materials & Procedure. Thirty triads were sampled from Lin and Murphy (2001, 
Table 1, items 1-30). Each triad consisted of a base (pencil), a thematically related option 
(eraser), and a taxonomically related option (pen). On each trial the base appeared in the 
center of a computer display, above the response options, which appeared left and right of 
center on the same line. Participants in the Similarity condition were instructed to “Pick the 
response option that is most similar to [base]” by pressing the <1> or the <2> key. The 
Difference condition was identical except that participants were instructed to choose the 
option “most different from” the base. Assignment of taxonomic and thematic options to the 
left and right positions was counterbalanced across two lists. Each participant judged all 30 
triads, which appeared in random order. 
Results 
 Agreement was tested across participants (Lin & Murphy, 2001), whereas non-
inversion was tested across items (Medin et al., 1990). These analyses are reported separately 
below. 
Agreement. For each participant we calculated the proportion of trials on which the 
thematic option was chosen (thematic proportion). Participants were classified into three 
groups on the basis of binomial probability. Given 30 triads, any participant whose thematic 
proportion was between .31 and .69 (inclusive) exhibited no significant preference for either 
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taxonomic or thematic options. These participants constituted a “Mixed” response group. 
Participants who exhibited a significant preference for taxonomic options (i.e., thematic 
proportion < .31, binomial p < .05) were dubbed the “Taxonomic” group, and those who 
significantly preferred the thematic option (i.e., thematic proportion > .69, binomial p < .05) 
constituted a “Thematic” group.  
Table 1 and Figure 1 illustrate the distribution of participants among these groups. 
Participants tended to exhibit a clear preference for either taxonomic or thematic choices; only 
23% and 21% of participants in the similarity and difference conditions (respectively) chose 
the taxonomic and thematic options in roughly equal measure. Whereas 31% of participants 
consistently chose the taxonomic option as more similar to the base, 46% reliably chose the 
thematic option as more similar. The same pattern of contrasting choices was observed in the 
difference condition. Whereas 39% systematically chose the taxonomic option as more 
different from the base, another 39% regularly selected the thematic option.  
The prevalence of thematic choices among some participants could reflect a task 
demand to respond consistently across trials. For example, a participant who chose the 
thematic match on the first trial might have selected thematic matches for the remainder of the 
experiment in order to appear consistent (see Lin & Murphy, 2001, p. 10-11). If so, then 
participants who judged a triad with a high thematic proportion on their first trial should be 
more likely to have a high overall thematic proportion. In other words, participants’ overall 
thematic proportions should correlate with the average thematic proportion of the item they 
judged on the first trial. However, this correlation did not approach significance in either 
similarity [r = .05, p = .76] or difference judgments [r = -.20, p = .26]. Thus, the prevalence of 
thematic choices was not attributable to a consistency bias.  
Non-inversion. For each triad we calculated the proportion of thematic choices in the 
similarity condition and in the difference condition separately. Figure 2 plots these 
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proportions. The negative diagonal represents the theoretical inverse relationship between 
similarity and difference. If similarity and difference were inverses, then the 30 triads should 
be distributed evenly around the negative diagonal, and the overall proportion of thematic 
choices (collapsed across the similarity and difference conditions) should be .50. To illustrate, 
if a given triad elicited 25% thematic choices in the similarity condition, then 
complementarity would predict 75% thematic choices in the difference condition, so that 
averaging across the similarity and difference conditions would yield 50% thematic choices. 
Any deviation from this complementarity (i.e., thematic proportion = .50) would constitute a 
non-inversion of similarity and difference (Medin et al., 1990). 
As evident in Figure 2, the similarity and difference choices were indeed negatively 
correlated, although the strength of this relationship was surprisingly moderate [r (30) = -.53, 
p < .01]. More importantly, the stimuli tended to occur above the diagonal, with fewer 
observations below it. This property is confirmed by the overall proportion of thematic 
choices (M = .52, SE < .01), which deviated significantly from complementarity, t (29) = 
2.18, p < .05. Thus, similarity and difference were non-inverse. More specifically, the 
proportion of thematic choices was above chance for similarity [M = .54, SE = .02; t (29) = 
2.34, p < .05], but was at chance for difference [M = .49, SE = .02; p = .69]. As suggested by 
Simmons and Estes (2008), thematic choices dominated in similarity, but thematic and 
taxonomic choices were equiprobable in difference.  
Discussion 
Distinct groups of participants exhibited similarity judgments that strongly contrasted 
one another, and the same occurred for difference judgments as well. These results cannot be 
explained by the contrast model (Navarro & Lee, 2004; Tversky, 1977) or by structural 
alignment (e.g., Gentner & A. B. Markman, 1997). If similarity and difference were based on 
comparison only, then thematic choices should occur rarely (if ever). Thus, these models fail 
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to explain the prevalence—indeed, the dominance—of thematic choices. The generalized 
model, which includes both comparison and thematic integration (Bassok & Medin, 1997; 
Estes, 2003; Wisniewski & Bassok, 1999), provides only a partial explanation. Although this 
model can account for a consistent amount of thematic responding across participants, it does 
not explain the systematic individual differences in similarity judgments. Only the 
individualized model can explain these results. For some participants (i.e., the Taxonomic 
group in similarity and the Thematic group in difference), similarity and difference do appear 
to favor feature comparison. But for others (i.e., the Thematic group in similarity and the 
Taxonomic group in difference), thematic relatedness is clearly more central to similarity and 
difference. And yet a third group (i.e., Mixed) appear to weight the feature comparison and 
thematic integration processes more equally. Notably, however, this mixed responding was 
relatively rare. So evidently, similarity and difference both entail dual processes of 
comparison and integration, but the relative weightings of these two factors vary dramatically 
across participants. 
Furthermore, between-participant disagreement produced a non-inversion of similarity 
and difference. That is, thematic choices were more common than taxonomic choices in the 
similarity condition but thematic and taxonomic choices were equiprobable in the difference 
condition. So the thematic dominance in similarity was not complemented by a taxonomic 
dominance in difference, and hence a non-inversion of similarity and difference occurred (see 
Figure 2).  
One could argue that the non-inversion was simply the product of variability across 
samples (e.g., we happened to sample more Thematic participants in the similarity condition). 
We believe that this is unlikely. Previous demonstrations of non-inversion also manipulated 
judgment between participants (Bassok & Medin, 1997; Estes & Hasson, 2004; Medin et al., 
1990; Simmons & Estes, 2008), and in each of those experiments, relational matches tended 
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to be selected as both more similar to and more different from a base concept. If the effect 
were attributable to random sampling error, then some of these studies would be expected to 
exhibit the opposite effect – that is, a tendency to select attribute matches as both more similar 
and more different. Nonetheless, this sampling explanation of non-inversion is investigated 
more directly in Experiment 2.  
Experiment 1b 
The previous experiment demonstrated between-participant disagreement in similarity 
and difference judgments. However, similarity judgments are highly sensitive to a variety of 
task factors (Barsalou, 1982; Beck, 1966; Gentner & Brem, 1999), including the precise 
wording of the similarity question (e.g., Goldstone, 1994). In particular, Jones and Love 
(2007) found that participants are less likely to respond thematically when asked about how 
like items are, rather than how similar they are. Therefore, in order to test whether the 
prevalence of thematic responding might have resulted from a misconstrual of the term 
“similarity”, in this study we asked participants to choose the alternative that was more “like” 
the base. If the occurrence of thematic responding were contingent on this minor wording 
manipulation, it would undermine the supposition that thematic responding reflects a deeper 
conceptual preference. In contrast, between-participant disagreement under this condition 
would demonstrate the robustness of individual differences in the perception of similarity. 
Method 
 Thirty-five undergraduates participated. The procedure was identical to the similarity 
condition in Experiment 1a, except that for each item the word “like” was substituted for 
“similar to.”  
Results  
Despite substituting “like” for “similar to”, between-participant disagreement 
persisted (see Table 1). Nearly a third (31%) of participants was classified as Taxonomic, 
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while a full 57% of participants were classified as Thematic. Only 12% fell into the Mixed 
category. As in Experiment 1a, the preference for thematic matches was above chance [M = 
.60, SE = .01; t (29) = 8.71, p < .001]. In fact, this distribution of participants among the three 
response groups was statistically indistinguishable from the distribution in the similarity 
condition of Experiment 1a (left half of Figure 1) [χ2 (2) = 1.78, p = .41]. In other words, 
“similar to” and “like” elicited analogous patterns of responding.  
Discussion 
It is apparent from these results that the same between-participant disagreement 
obtained even though the task was designed to discourage thematic responses (Jones & Love, 
2007). This suggests a deeper conceptual basis for disagreement that cannot be dismissed as a 
misinterpretation of “similarity.” Participants appear to have strikingly different beliefs about 
the nature of similarity. To some participants common features are more important, while to 
others the relations between concepts are the most critical. Results therefore necessitate an 
individualized model of perceived similarity.  
Experiment 2a 
The presence of individual differences in similarity and difference judgments provides 
an important theoretical constraint on models of similarity. Moreover, those models are 
constrained further by the non-inversion of similarity and difference. All prior demonstrations 
of non-inversion (including Experiment 1a) have elicited similarity and difference judgments 
between-participants, so it is unclear whether individual participants exhibit non-inversion or 
whether it occurs only at the group level. In other words, do participants simply always select 
the same type of option (thematic or taxonomic) regardless of the task (similarity or 
difference), or do individual participants treat similarity and difference judgments as inverses? 
Perhaps eliciting both similarity and difference judgments of the same items from the same 
participants would reveal a complementary relationship between the measures, thereby 
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eliminating non-inversion. Presumably, if a participant judges pencil as more similar to eraser 
than to pen, that same participant would judge pencil as more different from pen than from 
eraser. If this is the case, then individual differences are relatively stable across judgments; a 
Thematic participant in similarity should become a Taxonomic participant in difference, and 
vice versa. To test this possibility, Experiment 2a was an exact replication of Experiment 1a, 
except that similarity and difference judgments were collected within-participants in two 
different phases of the experiment. If the same individuals were reliably to choose a given 
option as both more similar to and more different from its base, that would provide strong 
evidence of non-inversion. Furthermore, if the non-inversion is attributable to a greater 
reliance on thematic integration than on feature comparison, Thematic participants should be 
more likely than Taxonomic participants to exhibit non-inversion.  
Method 
Fifty-five undergraduates participated. The materials and procedure were identical to 
Experiment 1a, except that each participant judged both the similarity and the difference of all 
30 triads. At the beginning of the session, participants were randomly assigned to complete 
either the similarity judgments or the difference judgments. Participants then completed 
several unrelated tasks (e.g., a mediated priming experiment), and after approximately 20-30 
minutes they completed the other judgments. Thus the similarity and difference judgments 
were blocked, counterbalanced, and separated by approximately 20 minutes. 
Results 
Agreement. Participants were classified into response groups according to the criteria 
established in Experiment 1. To test for effects of presentation order (similarity first or 
difference first) we conducted a 2 (order) by 2 (judgment) ANOVA on thematic proportions 
with participants random. Because neither the main effect of order [F (1, 53) = .54, p = .47] 
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nor the order by judgment interaction [F (1, 53) = 3.53, p = .07] was significant, we collapsed 
across presentation order for the remaining analyses. 
As in Experiment 1a, the distribution of participants’ thematic proportions indicated 
between-participant disagreement in similarity and difference judgments (see Table 1 and 
Figure 3). In the similarity condition, over half of participants (55%) chose the taxonomic 
option most of the time, while over a third (38%) chose the thematic option for most trials. 
Only 7% of participants had thematic proportions in the middle interval, indicating that most 
people demonstrated a preference for one or the other type of option. In the difference 
condition, 27% of participants tended to choose the taxonomic option, while 62% preferred 
the thematic option. The percentage of participants having thematic proportions in the middle 
interval was again relatively low (11%), indicating that few people chose both option-types 
equally often. Thus, the present experiment replicated the between-participant disagreement 
in similarity and difference that was originally observed in the preceding experiment.  
Non-inversion. The proportions of thematic choices in the similarity and difference 
conditions are plotted in Figure 4. Recall that if similarity and difference judgments were 
complementary, then the items should be distributed about the negative diagonal, and the 
overall proportion of thematic choices should be .50. As in Experiment 1a, similarity and 
difference were indeed negatively correlated [r (30) = -.63, p < .001], but the majority of 
items were distributed above the negative diagonal. Thus, the overall proportion of thematic 
choices (M = .54, SE < .01) was significantly greater than .50, [t (29) = 8.70, p < .001]. This 
result indicates that similarity and difference judgments were non-inverse again. In 
Experiment 1a the thematic option was preferred in similarity judgments (M = .54, SE = .02), 
but the difference judgments exhibited no reliable preference (M = .49, SE = .02). Here in 
Experiment 2a both similarity and difference judgments exhibited a reliable preference: 
Whereas the taxonomic option was preferred in similarity [M = .43, SE = .01, t (29) = -5.80, p 
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< .001], the thematic option dominated in difference [M = .66, SE = .01, t (29) = 15.34, p < 
.001]. 
Across participants, the same option was selected as both more similar and more 
different on 33% of trials. The vast majority of these individual cases of non-inversion 
occurred with thematic options: The thematic alternative was chosen as both more similar and 
more different on 24% of trials, while the taxonomic alternative was chosen in both 
judgments only 9% of the time. This finding explains why the overall thematic proportion 
was greater than .50 (see above).  
Table 2 presents the distribution of participants among the three response group in 
each of the judgment tasks. If similarity and difference were inverse, then a participant who 
exhibited a taxonomic preference in similarity should exhibit a thematic preference in 
difference. Likewise, one who is Thematic in similarity should be Taxonomic in difference, 
and a Mixed participant should remain so across judgments. These groups of participants, 
who exhibited an inverse relationship between their similarity choices and their difference 
choices, appear in Table 2 as the positive diagonal (in bold font). As evident in the table, the 
most frequent pattern was of taxonomic similarity choices and thematic difference choices 
(45%). But perhaps more interestingly, 20% of participants showed a thematic preference in 
similarity and a taxonomic preference in difference. A further 4% of participants exhibited no 
clear preference in either judgment.  
All other cells in Table 2 (i.e., those that are not in bold) represent a non-inverse 
pattern of judgment. Some participants exhibited a thematic preference in both similarity and 
difference, while others exhibited a taxonomic preference in both judgments. Such occurrence 
of non-inversion within individual participants was nearly three times as common among 
Thematic participants (14.55%) as among Taxonomic participants (5.45%). Overall, 31% of 
participants exhibited non-inverse patterns of judgment in the similarity and difference tasks. 
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This result is even more powerful than Experiment 1a, since here the non-inversion occurred 
with the same participants judging the similarity and difference of the same items.  
Discussion 
  In Experiment 2a (as in Experiment 1a) some participants tended to choose the 
taxonomic match as more similar and the thematic match as more different. Other participants 
demonstrated the opposite pattern (Figure 3), as predicted by the individualized model. Few 
participants behaved as though they had no preference for a particular type of match. 
Importantly, the Thematic participants did not represent a small group of outliers, as one 
might expect if the generalized model were correct. Rather, there were comparable numbers 
of Taxonomic and Thematic participants. The results of the present experiment also provide 
strong evidence that the non-inversion (Figure 4) is due to a differential influence of thematic 
relations on similarity and difference. Participants who exhibited the non-inversion were 
approximately three times more likely to prefer thematic choices than taxonomic choices (see 
Table 2). Because there were no order effects, the attenuation of thematic responding in 
comparison to Experiments 1a and 1b was most likely the result of sampling differences. The 
individualized model predicts systematic between-participant disagreement, but does not 
specify the absolute dominance of thematic or taxonomic responding. Regardless of the 
overall number of Thematic participants in a sample, non-inversion is more likely to emerge 
from their judgments than from the judgments of Taxonomic participants.  
Experiment 2b 
Strikingly, some individuals in Experiment 2a systematically selected the same 
concept (typically the thematic match) as both more similar to and more different from the 
base concept. This somewhat surprising result raises the question of whether participants (a) 
intended to violate the inversion of similarity and difference, or (b) sought to uphold the 
inversion of similarity and difference, but failed to remember their similarity choices when 
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providing their difference choices (or vice versa). To test these possibilities, in Experiment 2b 
each participant judged both the similarity and the difference of the same triads on 
consecutive trials.   
Method 
 Thirty-two undergraduates participated. The materials and procedure were the same 
as Experiment 2a except that participants judged the similarity and difference of each triad on 
consecutive trials. Order of presentation (similarity first or difference first) was randomized 
within-participants, so that each participant judged similarity first on half the trials and judged 
difference first on the other half. The order of item presentation was counterbalanced across 
two lists.  
Results 
  Agreement. To test for an effect of presentation order (similarity first or difference 
first) we conducted a 2 (list) by 2 (judgment) ANOVA on thematic proportions, with 
participants random. Because the effect of list [F (1, 30) = .05, p = .82] and the list by 
judgment interaction [F (1, 30) = .80, p  = .38] were not significant, we collapsed across order 
in the remaining analyses. 
Despite judging similarity and difference on consecutive trials, participants continued 
to disagree in their choices (see Table 1 and Figure 5). Over half (62%) of participants 
reliably selected the taxonomic match in similarity (Taxonomic participants) and a quarter 
(25%) almost always chose the thematic match (Thematic participants). Only 13% of the 
participants had no clear preference for either match (Mixed participants). The pattern was the 
mirror image in difference, where most participants selected the thematic match (62%) and a 
substantial minority selected the taxonomic match (25%). Once again, few participants (13%) 
exhibited no preference. As in the previous experiments, the distribution of similarity and 
difference judgments was characterized by between-participant disagreement.  
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Non-inversion. The proportions of thematic choices in similarity and difference are 
plotted in Figure 6. Whereas in the previous experiments similarity and difference were 
moderately correlated, in this experiment the correlation was extremely strong [r (30) = - .99, 
p < .001]. Unlike the results of the previous experiments, neither type of option dominated 
similarity [M = .48, SE = .03; t (29) = -.57, p = .57] or difference judgments [M = .51, SE = 
.03; t (29) = .29, p = .78]. Thus, the overall thematic proportion did not differ from .50 [M = 
.49, SE = .02; t (29) = -1.47, p = .15], thereby indicating an inverse relationship between 
similarity and difference judgments. In terms of response groups, every Thematic participant 
in similarity became a Taxonomic participant in difference, and vice versa; and every Mixed 
participant remained in that category across judgments (see Table 3). When judging similarity 
and difference on consecutive trials, every single participant (in terms of response groups) 
exhibited a complementary relationship between similarity and difference.  
Discussion 
 The results of Experiment 2b demonstrate that individual differences in similarity and 
difference judgments are robust even when these choices are made on consecutive trials for 
the same item (Figure 5). Although there was somewhat less thematic responding in similarity 
than in the previous experiments, a substantial proportion of participants remained resolutely 
Thematic. Participants in Experiment 2b also tended to treat similarity and difference 
judgments as inverse (Figure 6). While almost a third (31%) of participants in Experiment 2a 
departed from complementarity, none did so in Experiment 2b (Table 3). Evidently, when 
memory allows, participants prefer to treat similarity and difference as inverses. Thus, non-
inversion is more than a group level phenomenon (Experiment 2a), but it appears to be 
sensitive to the proximity between similarity and difference judgments.    
Experiment 3 
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Several indirect lines of evidence suggest that thematic integration is less likely to 
influence similarity judgments when participants are induced to process the stimuli more 
deeply. Gentner and Brem (1999) demonstrated that time-pressure influences the extent of 
thematic responding. They contrasted responses to triads with taxonomic and thematic 
matches to a base with responses to triads with taxonomic and unrelated matches. Participants 
were told to choose the taxonomically similar alternative and were given either 1000 ms or 
2000 ms to respond. Participants incorrectly selected thematic matches more frequently than 
unrelated matches, suggesting that the thematic relatedness was confused with taxonomic 
similarity. Furthermore this effect was most prominent at the shorter deadline. Simmons and 
Estes (2008) found that instructing participants to base their judgments on features, and 
asking them to justify their responses, significantly attenuated the influence of thematic 
relations. And in the present experiments, we have found that thematic choices were less 
likely when similarity and difference judgments were directly contrasted on consecutive trials 
(Experiment 2b) than when the judgments occurred at different times (Experiment 2a). Given 
these findings, one could infer that thematic participants simply aren’t very thoughtful; when 
induced to invest more thought into their judgments, thematic responding decreases. This 
inference is consistent with Gentner and Brem’s (1999) suggestion that the thematic influence 
on similarity arises from inadvertently combining the outputs of comparison and integration.  
The primary purpose of Experiment 3 was to test this hypothesis that thematic 
respondents are perhaps less thoughtful than their taxonomic peers. To investigate this 
possibility, we assessed participants’ need for cognition (henceforth “NFC”), which is “the 
tendency for an individual to engage in and enjoy thinking” (Caccioppo & Petty, 1982, p. 
116). Given that individuals who are high in NFC tend to process information deeply 
(Lassiter, Briggs, & Slaw, 1991; Levin, Huneke, & Jasper, 2000), the hypothesis is that those 
same individuals should be less likely to make thematic judgments. Individuals low in NFC, 
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in contrast, should be more likely to make thematic judgments. Thus, NFC should correlate 
negatively with thematic responding.  
Alternatively, the thematic responding in the previous experiments could reflect 
participants’ genuine belief that thematic relations are a legitimate component of similarity. 
That is, perhaps thematic participants and taxonomic participants simply possess different 
conceptions of similarity. To assess this explanation of thematic responding, we directly 
probed participants’ beliefs about similarity. In particular, we gauged the extent to which 
participants agreed (or disagreed) that two things are similar if (a) they have the same 
features, (b) they belong in the same category, and (c) they occur in the same scenario. The 
first two potential sources of similarity (i.e., feature overlap and category co-membership) 
correspond to the comparison process and were expected to be favored by taxonomic 
respondents. The latter potential source of similarity (i.e., scenario co-occurrence) 
corresponds instead to thematic integration. The question of most interest here is whether 
thematic participants endorse scenario co-occurrence as a legitimate source of similarity. If 
so, that would indicate that their thematic responding is no mistake or confusion; thematic 
responding would be deliberate rather than thoughtless. If thematic participants were to reject 
scenario co-occurrence, however, this would support the supposition that thematic responding 
is inadvertent. So to summarize, if thoughtlessness explains thematic responding, then NFC 
should predict thematic preference. If, however, thematic responding reflects a belief about 
the nature of similarity, then participants’ tendency to identify thematic relations as relevant 
to similarity should predict thematic preference. 
A secondary purpose of Experiment 3 was to generalize the observation of thematic 
responding to more controlled stimuli and a potentially less biased task. Regarding the 
stimuli, the prevalence of thematic responding in the previous experiments could be due to 
various lexical factors such as word frequency, association, or co-occurrence frequency. That 
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is, participants might have been inclined simply to choose the alternative that was more 
frequent, more strongly associated with the base, or more likely to co-occur with the base in 
ordinary language use. To address these possibilities, in Experiment 3 we developed a new set 
of stimuli for which the taxonomic and thematic alternatives were matched for word 
frequency, strength of association with the base concept, and frequency of co-occurrence with 
the base concept. Regarding the task, it is possible that the presentation of two options on 
each trial of the experiment could artificially inflate the prevalence of thematic responding; 
participants may infer an implicit demand to choose the thematic option on at least some of 
the trials. To address this concern, in Experiment 3 we used a rating task in which participants 
rated the similarity of the base concept (e.g., “cake”) to a single other concept (e.g., “cookie”). 
To examine participants’ preferences for taxonomic or thematic responding, we can compare 
for each base concept its similarity to the taxonomic alternative and its similarity to the 
thematic alternative. If an individual consistently rates the base concepts more similar to their 
thematic match than to their taxonomic match, then she would be a thematic participant. This 
methodology presumably will provide a less biased measure of the prevalence of thematic 
responding.     
Method 
 Participants. Thirty-five undergraduates participated. 
 Materials & Procedure. Items consisted of thirty base concepts, each paired with one 
taxonomic and one thematic alternative. For example, dungeon was paired with basement 
(taxonomic) and torture (thematic). Stimulus characteristics are summarized in Table 4, and a 
complete list of stimuli is presented in Table 5. As shown in Table 4, the taxonomic and 
thematic alternatives were matched for word frequency (p = .55), forward association with the 
base (p = .78), backward association with the base (p = .47), and co-occurrence as indexed by 
both Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA; Landauer & Dumais, 2002; p = .60) and Google hits (p 
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= .53). Thus, any difference in ratings of the taxonomic and thematic alternatives cannot be 
attributed to the lexical factors of frequency, association, or co-occurrence. To disguise the 
nature of the task, each base was also paired with an unrelated filler item. Items were 
organized into three blocked lists to counterbalance the order in which participants 
encountered the three alternatives to each base concept.  
 Participants were randomly assigned to one experimental list that included all 90 
concept pairs (60 experimental and 30 filler). Each trial consisted of a base concept paired 
with a taxonomic match, thematic match, or unrelated filler, centrally presented on a 
computer display. Participants were instructed to rate the similarity, on a scale from 1 (not at 
all similar) to 7 (very similar) of the concept pairs. Responses were entered on the keyboard 
number pad. Items appeared in a pseudo-random order with the restriction that base concepts 
appeared only once in each third of a list, and with the order of taxonomic, thematic, and 
unrelated matches for each base counterbalanced across lists.  
After the rating task participants completed the short form of the Need for Cognition 
scale (Cacciopo, Petty, & Kao, 1984). Participants rated the extent of their agreement, on a 
scale from 1 (very strongly disagree) to 9 (very strongly agree), with 18 statements such as “I 
would prefer complex to simple problems” and “I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for 
long hours.”  Nine items (e.g., “Thinking is not my idea of fun.”) were negatively worded.  
Finally, participants indicated their degree of agreement, on a scale from 1 (very 
strongly disagree) to 9 (very strongly agree) with the following statements, which were 
presented in random order: 
    Two things are similar if they have the same features. 
Two things are similar if they belong in the same category. 
Two things are similar if they occur in the same scenario. 
Results 
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To test for an effect of list we conducted a 3 (list) by 3 (item type) ANOVA on 
similarity ratings with participants random. Because neither the main effect of list [F (2, 32) = 
1.79, p = .18] nor the list by item type interaction [F (4, 64) = .99, p = .42] was significant, we 
collapsed across lists for the remaining analyses. 
Agreement. Next, we calculated thematic preference based on the proportion of trials 
on which a participant assigned a higher rating to a thematic match with a base than to a 
taxonomic match with that same base. For example, a participant’s rating for dungeon / 
torture was compared to his rating for dungeon / basement. A thematic response was recorded 
if the rating was higher for the thematic pair. A taxonomic response was recorded if the rating 
was higher for the taxonomic pair. Instances where a participant assigned the same rating to 
both pairs were excluded from analysis. Finally, we divided each participant’s total thematic 
responses by the sum of thematic and taxonomic responses. This measure of thematic 
proportion ranged across participants from .00 to .91 (M = .43, SE = .05), indicating that 
substantial thematic responding was observed in the similarity ratings task, just as it was in 
the triad choice task of the preceding experiments. Importantly, the prevalence of thematic 
responding generalizes across tasks.  
  Participants were subsequently assigned to response groups on the basis of binomial 
probability. Because the number of relevant trials varied across participants (depending on 
how many taxonomic and thematic pairs elicited the same rating), binomial probability was 
assessed separately for each participant. As in the previous experiments, between-participant 
disagreement in thematic preference was evident (see Table 1): 40% of participants were 
Taxonomic and 23% were Thematic. Thirty-seven percent of participants fell into the Mixed 
response group. Thus, individual differences in thematic responding were obtained even when 
word frequency, association strength, and co-occurrence frequency were controlled. To 
illustrate the discrepant ratings of these participant groups, Figure 7 shows the mean similarity 
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ratings of taxonomic and thematic pairs by the Taxonomic, Mixed, and Thematic participants. 
As evident in the figure, Taxonomic participants rated the base concepts more similar to their 
taxonomic match than to their thematic match [t (11) = 5.65, p < .01], whereas Thematic 
participants rated the thematic matches more similar than the taxonomic matches [t (7) = -
16.08, p < .01]. The Mixed participants rated the taxonomic and thematic pairs equally (p = 
.14). This pattern of mean similarity ratings validates the separation of participants into these 
three groups. It also highlights just how different the Taxonomic and the Thematic 
participants are in their perceptions of similarity.  
 Need for Cognition. NFC scores were based on participants’ average rating on the 
questionnaire, with negatively worded items reverse-scored. Therefore, scores could 
theoretically range from 1 to 9, with 1 representing low NFC and 9 representing high NFC. 
Participants exhibited a range of scores (2.72 – 7.28) with a mean slightly above the mid-
point (M = 5.23, SE = .19). 
 Beliefs about Similarity. Scores on the follow-up questions could range from 1 to 9, 
with 1 indicating low agreement and 9 indicating high agreement. Participants exhibited a 
range of beliefs concerning the relevance of category co-membership (2 – 9), feature overlap 
(2 – 9), and scenario co-occurrence (1 – 9) to similarity. Category co-membership (M = 7.06, 
SE = .24) and feature overlap (M = 6.91, SE = .31) were perceived to be equally important to 
similarity (p = .49). However, scenario co-occurrence (M = 4.91, SE = .41) was perceived to 
be somewhat less important than either category co-membership [t (34) = 5.70, p < .001] or 
feature overlap [t (34) = 4.74, p < .001]. Inter-correlations between these measures are 
reported in Table 6. Category co-membership was significantly positively correlated with 
feature overlap. Participants who thought that membership in the same category was 
important to similarity also thought that feature overlap was important. Category co-
membership was also positively related to scenario co-occurrence. Participants’ follow-up 
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question ratings were then correlated with their NFC scores (see Table 6). NFC was not 
associated with participants’ beliefs about the importance of sharing features, belonging to the 
same category, or participating in the same scenario to similarity (all p > .40). The lack of 
association between NFC and scenario relevance was of interest. Evidently, participants who 
are low in NFC are no more likely than participants high in NFC to believe that scenario co-
occurrence is relevant to similarity. Thus, if low NFC participants are indeed more likely to 
exhibit thematic responding, it would not be attributable to a belief that scenario co-
occurrence is relevant to similarity. 
 Predicting Ratings. We initially tested whether participants’ NFC, category relevance, 
feature relevance, and scenario relevance were correlated with their thematic proportion. As 
shown in Table 6, NFC and scenario relevance were both marginally associated with thematic 
preference (p = .08 and p = .06, respectively). We therefore ran a regression analysis with 
these two factors as predictors of thematic proportion. The overall model fit was significant [F 
(2, 32) = 4.58, p < .05; R2 = .22], with both NFC [β = -.35, p < .05] and scenario relevance [β 
= .36, p < .05] significantly predicting thematic proportion. Participants who reported a low 
need for cognition were more likely to rate thematic matches more similar than taxonomic 
matches. This finding supports the hypothesis that thematic responding may not require as 
much “deep” processing as taxonomic responding. However, those participants who exhibited 
greater thematic responding were also more likely to endorse scenario co-occurrence as a 
legitimate source of similarity. This latter finding suggests that some participants do believe 
that similarity should include thematic relations, and their ratings were consistent with this 
belief.   
Discussion 
 Experiment 3 provides strong evidence for between-participant disagreement in the 
use of thematic relations in similarity judgments and demonstrates an effect of thematic 
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relations using a novel, well-controlled item set. Therefore, the previous results cannot be 
attributed to lexical factors (i.e., word frequency, association strength, or co-occurrence) or to 
the use of a biasing task. Notably, there was considerable agreement among participants 
concerning the similarity of taxonomic items (Figure 7). All three participant types gave 
roughly equal ratings to taxonomic items. Thus, thematic preference in the triad task does not 
appear to indicate a rejection of taxonomic similarity. Rather, it indicates the importance of 
thematic relations relative to a taxonomic standard. For instance, among Taxonomic 
participants, thematic relations are relatively less important than taxonomic relations, while 
among Thematic participants, thematic relations are relatively more important than taxonomic 
relations.  
The weighting of thematic relations in similarity judgments reflected differences in 
NFC. Participants who exhibited a strong thematic preference tended to enjoy thinking and 
problem solving less than participants who exhibited a weak thematic preference. The 
weighting of thematic relations was also associated with an overt belief that participation in a 
common scenario is a legitimate source of similarity. Participants with a strong thematic 
preference tended to rate thematic relations as more relevant to similarity than participants 
with a weak thematic preference. Interestingly, the observation that NFC and scenario co-
occurrence themselves were uncorrelated suggests that there may be two types of the thematic 
participants—those who believe that thematic integration should be a component of 
similarity, and those who simply do not process the stimuli very deeply. 
General Discussion 
The preceding experiments have yielded three important results. First, these 
experiments revealed considerable individual differences in the perception of similarity and 
difference. Participants tended to choose the same type of stimulus across trials for a given 
judgment. In similarity judgments, for instance, some participants reliably chose the thematic 
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match, while other participants reliably chose the taxonomic match. Few participants were 
agnostic in the choice between thematic and taxonomic stimuli. The surprising prevalence of 
thematic responding was equally evident whether judging which alternative is more “similar 
to” the base (Experiment 1a) or which is more “like” the base (Experiment 1b). In fact, 
participants continued to exhibit thematic similarity choices even when those judgments were 
directly contrasted with difference judgments of the same stimuli (Experiment 2a), though 
this thematic tendency was reduced when similarity and difference were judged on 
consecutive trials (Experiment 2b). Moreover, consistent thematic responding was evident not 
only in a triad choice task, but also in a similarity rating task (Experiment 3). Finally, 
participants’ thematic tendencies were predicted by both their need for cognition and their 
beliefs about similarity. Specifically, participants with a high need for cognition were less 
likely to exhibit thematic responding, whereas participants who believe that scenario co-
occurrence is a legitimate source of similarity were more likely to exhibit thematic 
responding. Although preliminary evidence supported the hypothesis of substantial individual 
variability in perceived similarity (Gentner & Brem, 1999; Simmons & Estes, 2008), these 
experiments provide the first demonstration of how robust this individual variability is, and 
how it relates to perceived difference.  
The second important observation of these experiments is that thematic responding is 
not simply a by-product of lexical factors. Previous demonstrations of a thematic effect on 
similarity (Bassok & Medin, 1997; Estes, 2003; Jones & Love, 2007; Simmons & Estes, 
2008; Wisniewski & Bassok, 1999) have not matched taxonomic and thematic items for 
potential confounds such as word frequency, association strength, and co-occurrence 
frequency. This is particularly problematic since many common thematically related concepts 
are also highly associated (e.g., milk / cow). However, a substantial number of participants in 
Experiment 3 rated thematic items as more similar than taxonomic items, even though these 
DISAGREEMENT IN SIMILARITY 33
were matched for frequency, association, and co-occurrence. Thus, the thematic effect on 
similarity is not attributable to these lexical factors.  
The third contribution of these experiments is to show that thematic relations may 
induce a non-inversion of similarity and difference. Experiment 1a corroborated the thematic 
non-inversion reported by Simmons and Estes (2008), and Experiment 2a provided the first 
within-participant demonstration of this non-inversion. Moreover, when participants’ 
similarity and difference choices were non-inverse, it was most often the thematic option that 
was chosen as both more similar to and more different from the base. Notably, however, the 
non-inversion was eliminated entirely when participants judged both the similarity and the 
difference of the same items on consecutive trials (Experiment 2b). Thus, non-inversion is 
more than a group level phenomenon, but it is sensitive to the influence of participants’ 
beliefs concerning similarity and difference. Below we discuss the theoretical and practical 
implications of these results. 
These results clearly support a dual process model of perceived similarity. Single 
process models such as the contrast model (Tversky, 1977) and the structural alignment 
model (e.g., Gentner & A. B. Markman, 1997) cannot explain the present results. If similarity 
was the result of comparison only, then participants should have chosen the taxonomic option 
consistently across trials, because taxonomically related stimuli are more easily aligned and 
have more commonalities than do taxonomically unrelated stimuli (A. B. Markman & 
Gentner, 1993-a). So given the reliable and systematic occurrence of thematic choices, these 
results undermine comparison-only models of similarity. Simply stated, a model of similarity 
that does not account explicitly for thematic integration cannot explain participants’ similarity 
choices.  
These findings also indicate that the current, generalized version of the dual process 
model (Bassok & Medin, 1997; Estes, 2003; Wisniewski & Bassok, 1999) must be extended 
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to describe accurately the influence of thematic integration on the perception of similarity. 
Understanding the systematic variability in thematic preference observed in the present 
experiments necessitates an individualized approach. In this model the weights assigned to the 
comparison and integration processes vary dramatically across individuals, but are consistent 
within an individual. Some participants weight comparison more than integration (e.g., 
Taxonomic participants), while others show the reverse pattern (e.g., Thematic participants). 
And, some participants assign the processes roughly equal weight (e.g., Mixed participants). 
Thus, the tendency to compare or integrate is constrained not only by stimulus and task 
factors, as originally proposed by Wisniewski and Bassok (1999), but also by an individual’s 
preference for a given process. In particular, the results of Experiment 3 suggest that a 
preference for thematic integration in similarity judgments may arise from two independent 
sources. As suggested by Gentner and Brem (1999), some thematic respondents simply don’t 
process the stimuli very deeply. For these participants, thematic integration may be confused 
with feature comparison. However, other thematic respondents are relatively more thoughtful, 
and they believe that thematic relations are important for similarity. These participants appear 
to respond thematically as a matter of deliberate choice.   
Note that an individualized dual process model can also accommodate individual 
differences in categorization. Recall that some participants tend to form thematic categories, 
while others prefer to categorize taxonomically (Lin & Murphy 2001; Murphy, 2001). 
Participants who put more weight on thematic relations in similarity judgments may go on to 
categorize thematically, and likewise participants who base their similarity judgments on 
attributes may tend to form taxonomic categories. That is, individual differences in the 
perception of similarity may explain the differences in categorization found by Murphy 
(2001; Lin & Murphy, 2001). 
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Like perceived similarity, perceived difference also necessitates an individualized dual 
process model. Some participants consistently chose the thematic alternative as more different 
from the base, whereas other participants consistently chose the taxonomic alternative. 
Despite the comparable pattern of results for similarity and difference choices, however, it is 
not sufficient to model difference as the opposite of similarity. As illustrated by the 
occurrence of non-inversion, perceived similarity and perceived difference diverge in the 
weighting of the thematic integration process. Specifically, the influence of thematic 
integration was attenuated in the perception of difference. This result corroborates Simmons 
and Estes (2008), who found that thematic relations account for less variance in difference 
judgments than in similarity judgments.  
Thus, it appears that different types of information are relevant to similarity and 
difference. Our results suggest that non-inversion is tied to the performance of participants 
who prefer thematic relations in similarity, since these participants tend to answer less 
consistently than those who prefer comparison. However, this explanation should be 
interpreted with caution. As seen in Experiment 2b, non-inversion depends on the contiguity 
between similarity and difference judgments. Presenting similarity and difference 
consecutively eliminates non-inversion, presumably because participants believe that these 
judgments should be complementary.  
The individual differences observed in the present experiments, although substantial, 
do not necessarily reflect large variability in conceptual knowledge; participants who 
categorize thematically are aware of the logic behind taxonomic categorization, and vice versa 
(Smiley & Brown, 1979). Likewise, participants in similarity tasks of the sort reported here 
likely are aware of both thematic and taxonomic information. This presumed knowledge of 
both thematic and taxonomic information opens the possibility that individuals may respond 
inconsistently across time. That is, if an individual holds both sources of information, there is 
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some probability that he may weight thematic information more heavily on one occasion than 
on another. Indeed, such within-participant inconsistency has been observed in categorization 
(Barsalou, 1989), although not in terms of a taxonomic versus thematic preference. However, 
two results argue against dramatic inconsistency in similarity judgments. First, Experiment 3 
demonstrated that the precise weights that individuals assign to the outputs of comparison and 
integration reflect differences in NFC; Thematic participants are less likely than their 
Taxonomic counterparts to enjoy thinking and problem-solving. Because NFC is stable over 
time, thematic responding should also remain relatively stable over time. Furthermore, 
Thematic and Taxonomic participants appear to weight comparison and integration differently 
because they hold different beliefs about what information is relevant to similarity. 
Participants who believe that participation in the same scenario is important to similarity tend 
to exhibit a strong thematic preference. Intuitively, it seems unlikely that participants’ beliefs 
about similarity will change substantially across time, and hence their similarity judgments 
should also remain stable across time. However, more direct investigation of within-
participants consistency in similarity judgments may be a fruitful direction for further 
development of the individualized dual process model. 
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Exp't Task N Min Max M SE N Min Max M SE N Min Max M SE
1a Sim 11 0.00 0.20 0.05 0.02 8 0.37 0.67 0.50 0.04 16 0.73 1.00 0.90 0.02
Dif 13 0.00 0.30 0.12 0.03 7 0.37 0.63 0.46 0.04 13 0.73 0.97 0.89 0.02
1b Sim 11 0.00 0.23 0.07 0.02 4 0.37 0.60 0.52 0.05 20 0.77 1.00 0.92 0.02
2a Sim 30 0.00 0.30 0.09 0.02 4 0.33 0.67 0.51 0.07 21 0.70 1.00 0.89 0.02
Dif 12 0.00 0.27 0.08 0.02 9 0.37 0.60 0.50 0.03 34 0.70 1.00 0.91 0.02
2b Sim 20 0.00 0.20 0.08 0.02 4 0.33 0.43 0.38 0.03 8 0.83 1.00 0.91 0.02
Dif 8 0.00 0.17 0.09 0.02 4 0.57 0.67 0.63 0.02 20 0.73 1.00 0.88 0.02
3 Sim 12 0.00 0.32 0.11 0.03 15 0.35 0.64 0.50 0.03 8 0.68 0.91 0.79 0.03
Taxonomic Mixed Thematic
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of participant groups (Taxonomic, Mixed, Thematic) as a function of task (Similarity, Difference), Experiments 1-
3. 
 
 
Table 2. Distribution of participants’ choice patterns (Taxonomic, Mixed, Thematic) in each 
task (Similarity, Difference), Experiment 2a. 
Difference
Taxonomic Mixed Thematic Total
Taxonomic 5.45% 3.64% 45.45% 54.55%
Similarity Mixed 1.82% 3.64% 1.82% 7.27%
Thematic 20.00% 3.64% 14.55% 38.19%
Total 27.27% 10.91% 61.82%  
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Difference
Taxonomic Mixed Thematic Total
Taxonomic 0.00% 0.00% 62.00% 62.00%
Similarity Mixed 0.00% 13.00% 0.00% 13.00%
Thematic 25.00% 0.00% 0.00% 25.00%
Total 25.00% 13.00% 62.00%
Table 3. Distribution of participants’ choice patterns (Taxonomic, Mixed, Thematic) in each 
task (Similarity, Difference), Experiment 2b. 
 
Note. “Word Frequency” = written frequency in the Kucera-Francis norms; “Forward Association” = probability of producing the base given the 
alternative, from the Nelson et al. (1998) norms; “Backward Association” = probability of producing the alternative given the base, from the 
Nelson et al. (1998) norms; “LSA” = cosine values from the “General reading up to 1st year college” online corpus; “Google” = number of hits 
(in millions) obtained in a search of “[alternative] [base]” on google.com, data retrieved on 9/21/2007. The taxonomic and thematic alternatives 
did not differ significantly in any of these measures. 
Alternative M SE M SE M SE M SE M SE
Taxonomic 23.8 6.6 0.15 0.04 0.10 0.04 0.39 0.03 9.25 4.26
Thematic 29.5 6.6 0.16 0.04 0.14 0.03 0.36 0.04 6.35 2.25
Word Frequency Forward Backward LSA Google
Association Co-occurrence
 
Table 4. Stimulus characteristics, Experiment 3. 
 
Table 5. Stimuli, Experiment 3. 
Base   Taxonomic   Thematic 
bee   butterfly   honey 
bird   robin    nest 
cake   cookie    birthday 
carrot   celery    rabbit 
cow   pig    ranch 
crown   hat    queen 
dog   cat    bone 
dungeon  basement   torture 
dust   soot    broom 
flower   plant    vase 
fur   hair    coat 
jar   bottle    jelly 
knight   soldier    armor 
lamp   flashlight   desk 
monkey  primate   banana 
movie   documentary   producer 
needle   pin    thimble 
net   rope    fish 
oyster   clam    pearl 
pastry   tart    baker 
prison   jail    criminal 
river   lake    boat 
robe   cloak    bath 
sapphire  emerald   ring 
sheep   goat    wool 
ship   yacht    sailor 
shirt   jacket    tie 
smoke   smog    fire 
squirrel  rat    nut 
tent   hut    camp 
  
 
DISAGREEMENT IN SIMILARITY 45
Table 6. Inter-correlations (r) between Thematic preference, NFC, and follow-up questions, 
Experiment 3. 
Thematic Category Feature Scenario  
Preference Relevance Relevance Relevance 
 
Category 
Relevance .17   
 
Feature 
Relevance .19  .74*   
 
Scenario 
Relevance .32†  .42*  .32   
 
NFC  -.30†  .14  .11  .12  
Note. * p < .05; † p < .08. df = 35. 
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Figure 1. Distribution of participants’ choice patterns (Taxonomic, Mixed, Thematic) as a 
function of task (Similarity, Difference), Experiment 1a. 
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Figure 2. Proportion of thematic choices in difference plotted as a function of proportion of 
thematic choices in similarity, Experiment 1a. 
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Figure 3. Distribution of participants’ choice patterns (Taxonomic, Mixed, Thematic) as a 
function of task (Similarity, Difference), Experiment 2a. 
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Figure 4. Proportion of thematic choices in difference plotted as a function of proportion of 
thematic choices in similarity, Experiment 2a. 
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Figure 5. Distribution of participants’ choice patterns (Taxonomic, Mixed, Thematic) as a 
function of task (Similarity, Difference), Experiment 2b. 
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Figure 6. Proportion of thematic choices in difference plotted as a function of proportion of 
thematic choices in similarity, Experiment 2b. 
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Figure 7. Mean similarity ratings as a function of response group and item type, Experiment 
3. 
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